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This thesis seeks to refine our understanding of the social construction of terrorism 
designation. I examine formal terrorism designations made by the United States (U.S.) Department 
of State. Conceptualizing terrorism as marker of organizational illegitimacy and threat to national 
interests, I advance the premise that as the claims-maker, the State Department’s designation of 
terrorism is socially constructed and strategically driven by a combination of both interests and 
legitimacy. I draw a constructivist framework and revisit the contextual analysis of social reality 
while putting the terrorism construction to its center. While a review of contextual constructionism 
contributes to the social problem literature, my framework invites the fields of Public Policy and 
International Relations (IR) into the analysis of how U.S. views the non-state actors as reflected in 
its patterns of terrorism designation. I intend to develop theoretical and analytic tools for 
understanding and furthering the social construction perspective that should be central in terrorism 
designation and definition. Drawing from institutionalist theories, I analyze the roles of collective 
legitimacy and national interest in the U.S designation of terrorism. I show that a constructivist 
analysis of terrorism designation is not sufficient based on the concept of legitimacy. State’s 
national interests play a role in this process. Yet, national interests need not originate from 
materialist concerns. The social construction of national interest provides different insights on 
which non-state actors are more likely to be designated as terrorists. My findings indicate that the 
roles of legitimacy and interest should not be treated as opposition but as capturing two ends of a 
continuum of terrorism designation. My framework calls for a synthesis of literatures, theories and 
approaches, where social constructionism awaits. Given that terrorism is widely deemed to be one 
of the primary threats to U.S. security, how the United States designates non-state actors as 
terrorists also provides insights into our understanding of its overall foreign policy posture. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Terrorism plagues our world today as warfare has become increasingly urbanized and 
asymmetrical in the 21st century. Lives lost from terrorism has risen nine-fold since the year 2000, 
although 78 percent of all deaths befell only five countries; Iraq, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan 
and Syria (Global Terrorism Index, 2015). A spate of attacks in Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey and 
France showed once again that terrorism continues to be a global threat to our world and the ways 
to counter it require a great deal of political, social and economic measures.   
Terrorism is merely a new phenomenon and it is a social problem that does not exist 
independent of the threat perceptions of people around it. Indeed, social problems are the degree 
of felt concern over a given issue or condition irrespective of its objective seriousness. The social 
problem of terrorism is a good example of such contextual perspective. This degree of threat 
perception can manifest itself:  
“To the constructionist, the subjective reality of social problems can be measured or 
manifested in: the introduction of bills in legislatures to criminalize, outlaw, or otherwise 
address the behavior and the individuals supposedly causing the condition; the ranking of 
a condition or an issue in the public’s hierarchy of the most serious problems facing the 
country” (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2009, p. 153).  
The formal designation of terrorism, as manifested in the Department of State’s Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations (FTO) list then, warrants a constructionist analysis. Consider for example, 
why Irish Republican Army (IRA) or Communist Party of India (Maoist), both of which carried 
out violent attacks and met the criteria of designation, were not designated; but the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a group that sought to overthrow the government of Uzbekistan 
and establish an Islamic caliphate, is designated although the group is operationally inactive since 
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the year 2001 and is considered as “a misnomer than a threat” (Stein, Foreign Military Studies 
Office, 2013). 
I focus my analysis on the U.S. case of terrorism designation for theoretical and empirical 
reasons. The United States is a leading global actor in combatting terrorism and a policy or norm 
entrepreneur on blacklisting terrorist groups (Prakash, 2013). This is noticeable in similar lists 
adopted in the United Kingdom, United Nations and European Union following the United States 
wherein such lists has existed comparatively for a longer time.i The process of designation might 
vary across these actors, yet the constructivist framework presented in this thesis can be applied 
more generally to the question of designation as the variation in institutional design across these 
actors does not necessarily limit generalizability. Prior research offers a thorough case illustrating 
such variation across democracies while developing applicable models of designation as well 
(Beck and Minor, 2013).  
Considering its elaborate bureaucratic structure, a global security establishment with 
geographic combatant commands, adaptation of U.S. military, intelligence and law enforcement 
agencies to the tasks of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency that fought two wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan to combat terrorism on global scale, an analysis of who terrorists are and how they 
are made to be is worth of investigation.  
Chapter 2: Constructivist Framework 
“All forms of political organization have a bias in favor of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict 
and the suppression of others because organization is the mobilization of bias. Some issues are organized 
into politics while others are organized out.” (Schattschneider, 1960/1975, p.71) 
Problem Definition, Social Constructions and Contextual Constructionism  
Political issues are often so complex that they are open to alternative interpretations 
(Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2001; Chong & Druckman, 2007). How issues or conditions are defined 
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as policy problems affects governmental actions through which alternative policy solutions are 
sought (Crenshaw, 2001; Dery, 2000; Jeon & Haider-Markel, 2001; Waugh, 2002). Therefore, it 
is important to understand why some problems stimulate government action while others are 
ignored and why a problem is defined in one way or another. This also helps to locate where power 
lies in political system (Anderson, 2014). Stone (1989) argues that “problem definition is a process 
of image making, where the images have to do fundamentally with attributing cause, blame, and 
responsibility” (p.282). The process is more than such attributions as well. Rochefort & Cobb 
(1994) assert that it also informs about “a condition’s perceived social significance, meaning, 
implications” (p.3), and state that how a problem is emphasized or deemphasized helps push an 
issue to policy agenda. This process of describing problems in the political arena is problem 
definition.  
What is the perceived social significance of terrorism and how is it defined? When put in 
context with other forms of violence, terrorism constitutes a lesser problem, per se, considering 
more than 435,000 people are murdered each year, over 13 times more than the number of lives 
lost from terrorism (Global Terrorism Index, 2015). According to U.S. State Department, from 
2001 to 2014, more than 400,000 people died by firearms inside the U.S, while domestic acts of 
terrorism claimed 3,030 lives.ii The number of U.S. citizens killed overseas as a result of incidents 
of terrorism from 2001 to 2014 was 345, while the percentage of lives lost from terrorism that have 
occurred in the West since 2000 is merely 2.6. (START, 2015).iii Still, Americans today cite 
defending the U.S. against terrorism as a top policy priority (76%) while strengthening the nation’s 
economy (75%) and reducing crime (57%) is behind on the list (Pew U.S. Politics & Policy Center, 
2015).iv Although terrorist violence might be regarded as a relatively rare event and it is “one of 
the minor causes of human suffering in the world” (Roberts & Horgan, 2010; Williams, 2012, p. 
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172), terrorism disrupts our most deeply held norms and expectations. As Lizardo (2008) puts it, 
a war between nation-states or a civil conflict might alarm us, but they hardly “cause the shock 
and horror that comes from terrorist attacks” (p. 95). Terrorist violence seeks publicity, aims to 
affect audiences larger than its immediate victims and shakes the foundations of society (Hoffman, 
2006; Walt, 2015; Wardlaw, 1989). Therefore, the perceived significance of terrorism is often 
higher than most other social problems and it stimulates immediate government actions. A few 
examples of government action stimulated terrorism were the creation of the Deparment of 
Homeland Security after 9/11 terrorist attacks or the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Reveron, 
Gvosdev, & Owens, 2014). 
The question, then, arises: How do we define terrorism? As a policy problem, terrorism 
has been defined as a crime and law enforcement issue, as warfare or a threat to national security 
issue, as a social and economic issue, and as a religious and cultural issue, even hinting a clash of 
civilizations to an extent (Crenshaw, 2001; Neumayer & Plümper, 2009; Spencer, 2012; Waugh, 
2002). How terrorism is defined or redefined as a policy problem is important because it influences 
which particular political institution has jurisdiction and thus can claim charge for policymaking 
initiative. To name a few, these institutions range from the Department of State, the Department 
of Defense to the Health and Human Services (HHS) and its Center for Disease Control. However, 
in the case of terrorism, a more complicated concern, which allows for alternative problem 
definitions and framing (Pokalova, 2010), is actually the equivocal nature of the phenomenon 
terrorism itself. 
It is no secret that there is not a consensus among not just academics but also between 
governments on what constitutes terrorism. Considerable amount of theoretical work on terrorism 
studied definitions (Cooper, 2001; Hoffman, 2006) including identifying common targets or 
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actions of terrorist violence (Bergesen, 2007; Goodwin, 2006; Tilly, 2004) and focusing on who 
the terrorist actor is (Gibbs, 1989; Lizardo, 2008). While Jongman & Schmid (1988) maps more 
than hundred definitions in terrorism literature, there are at least twenty different legal definitions 
of terrorism among U.S. governments (Perry, 2003). Beyond such variance, the phenomenon itself 
is loaded with political and moral debates besides its theoretical and methodological challenges.v 
As PLO Chairman Arafat famously stated in a speech before the United Nations, “One man’s 
terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” (as cited in LaFree & Ackerman, 2009, p. 348). 
Therefore, the ambiguous, selective, and politicized nature of terrorism makes way for a fluid 
space where social constructions of terrorism help us make sense of what it is and shape how we 
respond to it (Chou, 2015).  
The phrase “social construction” has been introduced by Berger & Luckmann (1966) in 
The Social Construction of Reality, although constructivist philosophy has deeper roots that goes 
back to Immanuel Kant and Max Weber. The notion is that the social world is not a given and it 
does not exist out there independent of the thoughts and ideas. Relatedly, terrorism is a social 
construction: not a given objective condition per se, but a socially constituted problem contested 
within a definitional process (Ben-Yehuda, 2012; Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2009, p. 151; Turk, 
2004). While much about social constructions of social problems mostly has been written by 
sociologists (Best, 1989; Spector & Kitsuse, 1977),vi social constructionist framework has also 
fostered a vast research in political science both in Public Policy and International Relations.  
In Public Policy research, analyses of target populations (e.g. deviants) applies a social 
constructionist framework. For example, Schneider, Ingram and deLeon (2014) illustrate the 
construction of deviants such as criminals, sex offenders, drug dealers and state that “Historically, 
the politics of punishment has dominated much of public policy toward deviants, as well as illegal 
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immigrants and more recently, terrorists” (p. 112, emphasis added). Thus, parallels can be drawn 
from the the social construction framework in public policy, which has been applied to target 
populations, to the designation of others as terrorists. Going back to works as early as Edelman’s 
(1964), this framework has been used beginning with the works of Schneider and Ingram (1988) 
based on the idea that target populations in public policy design are chosen because of their positive 
or negative social constructions, enabling political leaders to gain more political capital as they 
work for the ‘good’ people and punish the ‘bad’ people. The social construction of the ‘terrorist’ 
speaks to this policy goal and designating groups becomes a policy instrument. In IR, 
constructivism is an empirical approach that takes on study of international system, which does 
not exist out there on its own, is constructed as the outcome of a set of ideas, a body of thought, a 
system of norms (Jackson & Sørensen, 2007; Wendt, 1992). For example, categorization of the 
other constructs the self and thus leads to the production of policies concerning others  (Campbell, 
1998; Hopf, 2002; Ruggie, 1998, p. 873; Wendt, 1994, p. 386). Othering in identity construction 
have instrumental roles in shaping the boundaries of policymaking in a subtle yet calculated way. 
Adler-Nissen (2014) argues, for example, how a separation of us from them in the stigmatization 
processes infers that “the labeled group is slightly less human, or, in extreme cases, not human at 
all” (p.147).vii The U.S. response to 9/11 terrorists is a good example of otherness in this regard.  
Eventually, both Public Policy and IR literatures offer promising insights in order to study 
terrorism within a social constructionist framework. Moreover, placement of a group on the United 
States Department of State’s Foreign Terrorist Organizations list, in my view, as a foreign policy 
instrument for counterterrorism is at the crossroads of both literatures. Therefore, I argue that not 
only terrorist violence, as a policy problem or a social problem, but also how deviants or others 
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are constructed, i.e. how non-state actors are designated as terrorists, warrants a social 
constructionist perspective and thus motivates my constructivist approach.viii  
I should emphasize that even though one could expect this approach to advance a post-
modernist methodology, I cannot see why a social constructionist framework cannot argue for the 
centrality of social factors such as interests and values (Benjamin & Duvall, 1991), while also 
posing a structural constructivist approach. As such, while terrorism is a social construct, 
designation of terrorism does not necessarily demand a post-structuralist methodology.ix There are 
few yet hopeful attempts to study constructivist concepts (e.g. narratives) with a positivist 
methodology (Jones & McBeth, 2010).x In addition, ontological orientations of a post-structuralist 
analysis of the subject matter in hand would lean towards what Goode & Ben-Yehuda (2009) calls 
a strict constructionism in which there is no way of empirically verifying or refuting the reality of 
a social problem. Yet, I advance an approach to designation of terrorism what they call a contextual 
constructionist point of view, in which a claim, the reality that is socially structured in need of 
examination, both objectively exists and is subjectively regarded as a problem. As Goode & Ben-
Yehuda exemplifies, “drug abuse is both a problem objectively in that it kills a great many people 
and subjectively in that it is widely regarded as a problem” (p.152). As such, terrorism is a social 
problem: not a given objective condition per se, but a socially constituted problem. It both 
objectively and subjectively exists.  
To the contextual constructionist, Spector and Kitsuse (1977) argues, problem defining 
process is essential to look at (as cited in Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2009, p.154). Indeed, a look at 
the problem definition process, as I have highlighted, becomes important to locate where power 
lies in political system and who defines the social problems (Anderson, 2014). Spector and Kitsuse 
(1977), who contributed to the constructionist approach in social problem analysis, refers to actors 
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involved in problem defining process as “claims-makers” sustained by “interests or values, or a 
combination of them” (as cited in Rochefort & Cobb, 1994, p. 6, emphasis added). More 
specifically, Goode & Ben-Yehuda (2009) echo the same point, which recaps the core of my thesis; 
when discovering the social problem, “Constructionists emphasize the role of interests, resources 
and legitimacy” (p.154). Indeed. Incidentally, this is the exact departure point of my thesis because 
I propose the premise that as the claims-maker, the State Department’s designation of terrorism is 
socially constructed and strategically driven by a combination of both interests and legitimacy.xi 
Before I explore my independent variables, legitimacy and interest, in next chapters; I turn to my 
dependent variable for a brief detailed description and then turn to my independent variables to 
conclude the framework of my thesis. Theory, model and hypothesis will be discussed in next 
chapters.   
Designation of Terrorism 
The ambiguous, selective, and politicized nature of the terrorism phenomenon opens a fluid 
space allowing the social construction of terrorism and designation of others as terrorists as 
discussed above. The potential uncertainty is quite astonishing considering the legal, political and 
fiscal consequences the formal designation of terrorism carries. Placement of a group on State 
Department’s FTO list is regarded as one of the most critical counterterrorism policy instruments 
(Cronin, 2003; de Jonge Oudraat & Marret, 2010). Turk (2004) notes, “pronouncements by the 
U.S. State Department reflect assessments not only of objective threat but also of the political, 
economic, and military implications of naming particular entities as terrorist” (Turk, 2004, p.272). 
Therefore, studying the pattern of designation shall illustrate not only how it is socially constructed 
but also how these constructions shape counterterrorism measures in military, judicial or 
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immigration policies. It is also worth exploring because the US government’s designations play a 
central role in guiding the policy in other countries (Beck & Miner, 2013, p. 848) 
In 1997, the State Department to introduced the FTO list regarding information on 
international terrorist groups. FTOs are foreign organizations that are designated as Tier I category 
of terrorist organizations by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 219 of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The Bureau of Counterterrorism in the State Department 
designates  non-state actors as terrorists following several criteria: (a) the organization must be 
foreign; (b) the organization must engage in terrorist activity or terrorism, or retain the capability 
and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism; (c) the organization's terrorist activity or 
terrorism must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, 
foreign relations, or the economic interests, in addition to the safety of individual Americans) of 
the United States. (Pillar, 2003). The State Department denotes  FTO designations “play a critical 
role in the fight against terrorism and are an effective means of curtailing support for terrorist 
activities, stigmatizing the designated groups internationally and pressuring groups to “get out of 
the terrorism business” (United States Department of State, 2015). As the organization who can 
command resources (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2009), the State Department wields bureaucratic 
power as it bears the role of foreign policy maker (Lowi, Ginsberg, & Shepsle, 2011).  
The designation of terrorism has practical advantages. As a frame of reference it facilitates 
cooperation internationally and it concentrates domestic inter-agency counterterrorism efforts 
including deportations, criminal prosecutions, freezing fund-raising activities and intelligence 
gathering depending on the problem definition procured. Considering such efforts could be 
sustained with other statutes in place in the U.S. (Pillar, 2003), or in other democracies as similar 
agencies tasked with responsibilities on criminal, legal, immigration and fiscal matters already 
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exist, it should be stressed that the major role of terrorism designation is certainly a symbolic one, 
which lends itself to constructivist inquiry, one that this thesis takes on.  
Legitimacy 
In practical terms, the concept of legitimacy holds a central place in terrorism designation. 
The goal of terrorism designation is to delegitimize the actors engaged in terrorism and curb the 
potential recruitment and sympathy from audiences (de Jonge Oudraat & Marret, 2010). Thus, 
designation stigmatizes and isolates terrorists and “heightens public awareness and knowledge of 
terrorist organizations” (Pillar, 2003). These goals are indeed located in the social constructionist 
framework. The constructions of the other position our understanding in relation to the self and 
hence legitimize, and even warrant certain foreign policy actions fulfilled by the self against the 
other (Weldes & Saco, 1996). This positional distance between the self and the other, or deviants 
in Schneider & Ingram's case for example, leads to viewing the claims of the “powerful advantaged 
groups as being more legitimate” than deviants who “have been stigmatized and labeled by the 
policy process itself” (1993, p. 342-344).  
Theoretically, I advance the premise that terrorism designation is a social construction, 
albeit one that is driven by legitimacy. Beginning with Weber (1978), the concept has been an 
attribute of the state, in which the legitimate monopoly on the use of force is the defining feature 
of modern state. Therefore, accumulation of legitimacy as a symbol of state meant that other 
contenders for legitimacy, i.e. terrorists, had to lose out (Loveman, 2005). As Lizardo (2008) 
highlights, “terrorists are the international state system’s outlaws, incapable of justifying their 
actions within this nation-centric ‘Westphalian’ system of rules and conventions” (p.95, emphasis 
original). This conceptualization of terrorism, in fact, encourages the operationalization of the 
concept of legitimacy in my model. Lizardo aims to introduce “an operational characterization” 
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by drawing our attention to the institutional rules, which “allows for a more analytically 
advantageous focus on the structural and relational features that all episodes of non-state terrorism 
in the modern (Westphalian) system have in common” (p.98). Taking on this idea, Chou (2015) 
presents an admirable model, in which the the concept of legitimacy is fleshed out as the defining 
feature of state. Those who do not belong to category of modern Westphalian stateness as Lizardo 
outlined, will “pay the price of illegitimacy” (Chou, 2015,p.3; Zuckerman, 1999). More clearly, as 
Chou (2015) puts it: 
“Illegitimate political actor, those who infringe on the state’s monopoly on the use of force  
…is, in modern political discourse, occupied by the terrorist: a non-state actor who engages  
in political violence without the right that defines (and is today awarded exclusively to) the  
modern system of states, the right to be violent” (p.2-3). 
In order to operationalize legitimacy, I draw from this conceptualization and his model of 
modern state as effective, representative, and secular (Chou, 2015). Thus, I hypothesize that 
legitimacy, conceptualized as stateness, drives terrorism designation. The more a group belongs to 
the category of state, the more it will appear legitimate, thus will be at a lower risk of being 
designated as terrorist. In other words, the U.S. State Department is more likely to designate non-
state actors as terrorist when it regards them as illegitimate; that is, if they are far-off in stateness 
(i.e. the category of state).  
Our attribution of legitimacy to the state, drives the terrorism designation, therefore its 
social construction. Indeed, “legitimacy is a socially constructed, cultural-cognitive condition that 
assigns characteristics of good, appropriate and desirable to actions of an organization or other 
social entity based on the subjective perceptions of interested observers” (Scott, 2001). Although 
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the scope of my work doesn’t expand to explore how it is constructed, it is valuable to emphasize 
that legitimacy is a social construct. 
National Interests 
In practical terms, the role of interests clearly manifests itself in terrorism designation. The 
State Department is the chief bureaucratic power in foreign policy making and “protecting core 
U.S. interests” is at the center of its lexicon (U.S. State Department, 2014). Crenshaw (2001) 
argues, U.S. counterterrorism policy is not simply a response to the threats of terrorist violence, 
but “a reflection of the domestic political process” (p.329). This process is shaped by a policy 
debate in which government institutions, the media, interest groups, the elite and mass public 
interpret the threat of terrorism and determine and implement policy. Weldes (1996) in her 
renowned article narrates, in my view, the same process: 
“Drawing on constructivist assumptions, I argue that before state officials can act for the 
state, they need to engage in a process of interpretation in order to understand both what 
situation the state faces and how they should respond to it. This process of interpretation, 
in turn, presupposes a language shared, at least, by those state officials involved in 
determining state action and by the audience for whom state action must be legitimate. This 
shared language is that of the national interest” (p.275-276, emphasis original).xii 
Although how national interests are constructed is out of the scope of my argument, it is 
important to underline that national interest, like legitimacy, is a social construction. It is created 
by representations such as “our state and their state, or us and them”, as in Weldes’ case (p.287, 
emphasis original); or us versus non-state them, as in my case.xiii  
Building on the pioneering constructivist approach in Wendt's (1992) work, in which he 
argued “identities are the basis of interests” (Wendt, p.398), one can reckon then, that interests are 
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already embedded in the representations state officials, such as the State Department, create. In 
subject-positioning (i.e. us versus them), interests emerge not just out of inter-state interactions 
(1992, p.401), but also out of domestic political processes.xiv Indeed, Weldes (1996) contends, 
“more specifically, national interests emerge out of the representations, …out of situation 
descriptions and problem definitions, through which state officials and others make sense of the 
world around them” (p.280). Thus, in order to understand how threat of terrorism construes 
counterterrorism policies, taking national interests into account is imperative. After all, “it is 
through the concept of the national interest that policy-makers understand the goals to be pursued 
by a state's foreign policy” (Weldes, 1996, p.276).  
Theoretically, I advance the premise that terrorism designation is a social construction, 
albeit one that is also driven by interest. As Weldes (1996) repeats, the concept of the national 
interest has been focal to theories of international politics for its part in explaining state action. 
The recent research on terrorism designation, however, disregarded the concept of interest (Beck 
& Miner, 2013; Chou, 2015). I revisit the concept of interest and synthesize its analysis in terrorism 
designation. While early research such as Chomsky (2002) and Jackson (2005) viewed the social 
construction of terrorism as “merely a sublimated expression of American foreign policy interests” 
(Chou, 2015), recent works on terrorism designation adopt an organizational perspective and 
renounce the analysis of interests. For example, Chou (2015) views insertion of interests into 
analysis as a limit and associate it to “strongly constructivist theories of terrorism, in which 
political interests alone dictate which groups are labeled as terrorists” (p.20).xv  
In order to operationalize interest, I follow a similar categorical scheme I employed for 
legitimacy (Chou, 2015). Drawing from Art (2013); Bartholomees (2010); Reveron et al. (2014); 
and the Commission on America’s National Interests (2000), I introduce a categorical scheme for 
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interest categorization and develop a model of national interest that categorizes vital, important 
and peripheral U.S. interests. The State Department’s mission statements reflect these objectives 
such as “advancing the security of the American people by assisting countries around the world” 
in order to “prevent and counter threats to civilian security and effective governance, such as 
terrorism, violent extremism” so that these countries are able to build more “democratic, secure, 
stable, and just societies” (United States Department of State, 2015).xvi  
Conceptualized as national interests, the protection of fellow Americans, spreading of 
democratic values and assisting other countries can be explained by many realist accounts; yet, the 
social construction of these interests go mostly unnoticed. The national identity, the democratic 
values and providing international assistance as the global leader are what makes the positioning 
between us versus them. The policy outcomes of such positioning are numerous, e.g. Iraq War. 
The image of us, Americans, as a democracy and as the global leader tasked with fiscal and military 
assistance to others, has been socially constructed especially after the victory in 1945 (Reveron et 
al., 2014; Weldes & Saco, 1996; Weldes, 1996). The social construction of foreign policies hint 
this positioning “since 'we' Americans are 'freedom-loving democrats' and 'civilized Westerners', 
it makes sense that 'our' US interventions abroad are designed to advance liberty and freedom”, 
while on the contrary “aggressive totalitarians, duplicitous communists, puppets of the Kremlin, 
unstable underdeveloped states and uncivilized terrorists” hold the position of other (Weldes, 
1996, p.281-.289, emphasis added). These representations are already defined in the national 
interest in a contextual constructionist’s point of view. 
Thus, I hypothesize that national interest drives terrorism designation. The degree to which 
groups threaten U.S. interests, determines which groups are designated as terrorists.   
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Chapter 3: Theory, Methods and Data 
Following (Beck & Miner, 2013; Chou, 2015), I draw from new institutionalist 
organization theory that emphasizes the effects of social construction of identities and practices on 
organizational performance and forms. Neoinstitutionalist research on organizations use 
categorical schemas to illustrate how social construction drives the practices and forms 
organizations take (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; J. W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Still, new 
institutionalist research is limited in the sense that the concept of interest disregarded. The 
application of this theory on terrorism designation confirms this neglect (Beck & Miner, 2013; 
Chou, 2015). Schemas of organizations reflect not only the legitimacy, but also the interests that 
organizations strive to maintain. (Scott, 2008, p. 22). After all, as Stinchcombe (1987), an 
institutionalist theorist, points out “the structure in which powerful people are committed to some 
value or interest”, as I have maintained, is inherent and inseparable in organizations (p.107, 
emphasis added). In point of this, Beck and Miner (2013) inevitably succumb to this notion and 
point out that the State Department as the “expert categorizer”, i.e. the claims-maker as I have 
argued, “could have a large degree of leeway in their decision-making” in terrorism designation 
(p.842). This calls for the consideration of two issues: how this fluid large leeway implicates the 
concept of national interest in designation of terrorism and what this indicates for state autonomy. 
The new institutionalist perspective is restrictive in embracing the concept of interest. As (Abbott, 
1992) says, “The new institutionalists have to remember the power and interest that utilitarians 
never forget” (p.754). Thus, I argue that the roles of legitimacy and interest should not be treated 
as opposition but as capturing two ends of a continuum of terrorism designation. 
I employ a logistic regression model where the dependent variable is the dichotomous 
coding of whether or not a non-state actor has been designated as terrorist by the US Department 
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of State to estimate the effects of the independent variables on listing status. Logistic regression 
measures the relationship between the binary dependent variable and various independent 
variables by using probability scores as the predicted values of the dependent variable. The 
probability of being designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department assumes 
a distribution for the random component of the latent dependent variable. The standard logistic 
distribution in this random component allows using the standard logistic regression model 
(Wooldridge, 2003). 
I gathered my data for my dependent variable from the US Department of State Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations List. The main dataset I have utilized is the Uppsala Non-State Actor data 
built by Cunningham, Gleditsch, & Salehyan (2009),xvii which provides the estimated strength of 
a non-state rebel group relative to the country that it opposes, and whether the group is openly 
affiliated with an unarmed political group. Hence, I construct the variables for efficacy and 
representativeness from this data. From this dataset I construct a variable that takes a value of 1 if 
a non-state actor has the word “Islam” in its name and/or have a fundamentalist Islamic ideology, 
including Wahhabi jihadism. Examples include the Al-Shabaab (designated in 2008), The Islamic 
State of Iraq and the Levant (former Al-Qaida Iraq, 2004), and Eritrean Islamic Jihad (not 
designated). Building on this dataset, I constructed the other variables from various databases. For 
example, for the volume and severity of attacks on U.S. nationals, I used The Global Terrorism 
Database (START, 2013) is useful for my purposes, as it contains detailed information about 
location, year, and primary targets for more than 140,000 cases on domestic as well as international 
terrorist incidents that have occurred from 1970 to 2014. For an attack to be included in this 
database, it must meet at least two of the following criteria: (1) the act must be aimed at achieving 
a political, economic, religious, or social goal; (2) there must be evidence of an intent to coerce or 
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intimidate an audience beyond the immediate victims; and (3) the act must be outside the context 
of legitimate warfare. Following the trend in the literature, I collect my democracy scores from 
Cheibub et al. (2010), and USAID data from the US Greenbook. The units of my dataset are 
conflict dyad periods since each single conflict in the Uppsala data distinguishes between side A 
(government) and side B (a non-state actor).  
Chapter 4: Variables and Hypothesis 
In light of the framework and discussion of theory illustrated so far, this thesis tests several 
hypotheses. Briefly, I argue that legitimacy, conceptualized as stateness and interest, 
conceptualized as the threat to vital, important and peripheral U.S. national interests, determine 
which actors are designated as terrorist. First, groups that appear more like a modern state – 
effective, representative and secular – are more likely to be seen as legitimate, therefore, will be 
at lower risk of being designated as terrorists. Second, the groups that threaten the vital, important 
and peripheral U.S. interests, are more likely to be designated as terrorists by the US Department 
of State. The main variables and how they operationalize the theoretical concepts are as follows:  
Following Chou (2015), the stateness of non-state actor is measured in a continuum rather 
than a dichotomy; efficacy, representativeness, and secularism. This variation offers a satisfactory 
measurement of what modern state is like. Modern state’s legitimacy comes from its efficacy, 
representativeness, and secularism (Chou, 2015; O. W. Meyer, Boli, Thomas, & Ramirez, 1997). 
Modern state is effective as it delivers and secures public goods. Efficacy as a marker of legitimacy 
divides what is a weak state from a strong state (O. W. Meyer et al., 1997; Stinchcombe & Tilly, 
1991). I measure efficacy using a dichotomous variable that takes a value of 1 if the non-state 
actor’s the military strength relative its target country is much weaker (takes a value of 0 
otherwise). If the group is relatively weak, as opposed to the ideal state, it is assumed to be less 
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legitimate. Modern state also derives legitimacy from democracy, representation of its citizens’ 
shared political will and responsible government. Representation as a marker of legitimacy is 
among modern state’s features (Dahl, 1991; Rohrschneider & Whitefield, 2012). I measure 
representativeness using a dichotomous variable that takes a value of 1 if a non-state actor has 
explicit, confirmed and alleged links ties to an unarmed political group (takes a value of 0 
otherwise). The groups’ ties to political entities is assumed to be the marker of their legitimacy. 
Finally, modern state is secular. It has advanced its autonomy from religion (Casanova, 2011), and 
institutional separation of religion from state is cherished in all liberal states (Joppke, 2004). On 
the other side of the coin, Lizardo (2008) points to the handicap that religious non-state groups 
face: “the current global context of the dominance of Western, secular models of political and 
social organization” render such groups’ legitimacy (p.100). I measure secularity of non-state actor 
using a dichotomous variable that takes a value of 1 if the non-state embraces an Islamic 
ideology.xviii If it has a fundamentally religious ideology, it is less like the ideal state. Stateness is 
higher when representativeness takes a value of 1 and lower when efficacy and secularity variables 
take a value of 1. Specifically, tested hypothesis are:  
1. Non-state actors that are less like the ideal modern state are more likely to be designated as 
terrorists: 
a) Groups that are weaker in military terms are more likely to be designated as terrorists. 
b) Groups with ties to unarmed political groups are less likely to be designated as terrorists. 
c) Islamist groups are more likely to be designated as terrorists. 
Similar to the markers used to classify non-state actors, I draw the markers to classify U.S. 
national interests to reflect the categorical schema that U.S. State Department as the organization 
responsible for foreign policy-making constructs. The literature provides a clear guideline for me 
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to create this schema. Art (2013), Bartholomees (2010), Reveron et al. (2014), and the Commission 
on America’s National Interests (2000) more or less use the same conceptualization to categorize 
U.S. national interests: vital interests, important interests, and periphereal interests. Although, 
prioritization is not my objective, this variation offers a complete picture of how U.S. interests are 
constructed. The chief purpose of the U.S. foreign policy is protection of American security (Lowi 
et al., 2011). First, following Boutton & Carter (2014), I measure the vital U.S. interests as threats 
to the security of the American people by looking at a count of terrorist attacks within a country in 
which the United States is the primary target and construct the variables, Attacks and Casualty. I 
measure the count of attacks on U.S. nationals (including citizens, nongovernmental organizations, 
diplomatic facilities, businesses, etc.) for the former. The latter, Casualty variable accounts for the 
number of US citizens killed in terrorist attacks in a country. Contrary to previous literature (Beck 
& Miner, 2013; Boutton & Carter, 2014) however, I include the number of US citizens kidnapped 
and wounded into this variable from GTD as a stronger measure of severity that can affect the 
audience’s construction of threat. In the important interests category, I measure the threat to 
democracy looking at whether non-state actor targeted a democracy or not. This dichotomous 
variable takes the value of 1 if the target country is a democracy (otherwise 0). Promoting and 
defending democratic regimes is one of the important foreign policy objectives of the U.S. foreign 
policy (Bartholomees, 2010, Pillar, 2003). Finally, in the category of peripheral interests, I measure 
the assistance the U.S. provides to countries targeted by non-state actors. I look at the military aid 
as the measure of commitment to curb the threat U.S. seeks to prevent terrorism through “secure 
and stable” societies (Boutton & Carter, 2014). Specifically, tested hypothesis are:  
2. Non-state actors that threaten U.S. national interests are more likely to be designated as terrorist: 
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a1) The State Department is more likely to designate non-state actors in targeted countries 
as the number of attacks on U.S. nationals gets higher. 
a2) The State Department is more likely to designate non-state actors in targeted countries 
as the number of causalities of U.S. citizens gets higher. 
b) The State Department is more likely to designate non-state actors that target 
democracies.  
c) The State Department is more likely to designate non-state actors that target countries 
in which U.S. foreign aid flows, indicating threats to its interests. 
As well as the main variables outline above, two confounder variables are included in my 
analysis from these datasets. First, I included the variable ‘Old’ to control for the dyads before 
1997, when FTO list was introduced. The dyads that are active after 1997 take the value of 1 
(otherwise 0). Second, as argued by some literature (e.g., Chomsky 2002; Jackson 2005), in order 
to control for the materialist hegemonic interests that U.S. has in target countries, I included the 
variable ‘Mena’ that indicates whether a country is based in the Middle East or North Africa in the 
GTD database regions. The groups that operate in these regions that the value of 1 (otherwise 0).  
Chapter 5: Results, Discussion and Future Research 
In model 1, the findings confirm the previous work (Chou, 2015), that Islamist groups and 
relatively weak groups are more likely to be designated as terrorists by the State Department. That 
is, if the group’s strength is much weaker compared to the state it targets, it is more likely to be 
seen as illegitimate, therefore more likely to be designated. The representativeness marker of the 
groups is not statistically significant, yet in the expected direction. In model 2, the effects of the 
volume of attacks on U.S. nationals, target state’s regime and USAID are positively significant. 
However, severity of the attacks does not show significance. This confirms my initial expectations 
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that the State Department is more likely to designate groups that target U.S. nationals, democracies 
and countries which the U.S. sends foreign aid. Where U.S. interests are in jeopardy, the state takes 
action.  
U.S. Terrorism Designation 
           Model 1 Model 2     Model3 
 Islamic Ideology 2.469  3.235 
  (6.84)**  (6.56)** 
 Relative Strength 0.830  -0.037 
  (2.45)*  (0.09) 
 Political Ties -0.608  -0.542 
  (1.64)  (1.28) 
 Attacks   0.101 0.110 
   (4.70)** (4.71)** 
 Casualty  0.018 0.024 
   (1.08) (1.28) 
 Democracy  1.199 1.791 
   (3.37)** (3.84)** 
 USAID  0.002 0.000 
   (2.03)* (0.31) 
 M-East & N-Africa 1.046 1.537 1.367 
  (2.79)** (4.16)** (3.12)** 
 Activity after 1997 1.000 1.535 0.955 
  (2.90)** (4.30)** (2.36)* 
 _constant -3.743 -4.299 -4.819 
  (10.19)** (11.32)** (9.48)** 
N    578 577 577 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 z values in parentheses.  
 
However, in model 3, when the models are synthesized, a different picture appears. The 
statistically significant indicators are limited to groups’ Islamic ideology, the number of attacks on 
U.S. nationals, the democratic regime of targeted countries. USAID loses its significance along 
with the marker of group strength relative to the state. Relative strength also becomes negatively 
associated with designation, which would indicate if it is not relatively less weak, that is if the 
group has relative strength, it is more likely to be designated. We also see that designation is more 
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likely especially if groups are active after 1997. Moreover, groups operating in Middle East and 
North Africa are more likely to be designated as terrorists. This may indicate the power driven 
hegemonic inclinations. Indeed, Lowi et al. (2011) argued the U.S. has “strategic oil interests in 
the Middle East” (See graph 1). Some results contradict with some of the findings in previous 
works (Chou, 2015), while some other conform with them (Beck and Miner, 2013).  
What does these findings mean for social construction of terrorism designation? The 
Islamic fundamentalist groups are more likely to be designated as terrorists (See graph 2). That is, 
everything else equal, we would expect a fifteen percentage point increase in the probability of 
designation if we observe Islamic fundamentalist ideology in a group as opposed to not. Caution 
against the new wave of religious terrorism is confirmed with these findings. Moreover, the social 
constructions of us versus them could be inherent in U.S. designation since empirically, Islamic 
fundamentalism is rarely the driver of terror attacks in the West (Global Terrorism Index, 2015). 
The volume of attacks on U.S. nationals is in positive direction and significant (see graphs 
3 and 4); however, the severity of attacks is not. It is important to highlight that, contrary to earlier 
research, I also included the U.S. citizens wounded and taken as hostage, such as sixty-six hostages 
taken in Iran that did not result in deaths but marked a crisis, in order to capture all the effects that 
could influence the audience and construct the threat or positioning of them. Yet, not all attacks 
result in harming citizens. Thus, this confirms the empirical account I have provided in the 
beginning that, even though numbers of US citizens harmed from terrorism is low, it is not the 
number of US citizens, but the number of attacks that can give a better picture because it includes 
American educational and diplomatic institutions, military posts, international businesses, 
embassies, which are the symbols of “us”. Likewise, Lizardo’s (2008) proposition to include not 
just non-combatants but also military to the definition of terrorism therefore warrants attention. He 
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cautions, “Restricting terrorism to the targeting of civilians and non-combatants for the purposes 
of political violence …is not sufficient” and reminds the terrorist attacks which are closer to 
guerrilla warfare and is directed at the state and its symbolic representatives, such as USS Cole 
incident, also constructs the phenomenon of terrorism.  
When target country’s regime is democracy, the attacking groups are more likely 
designated as terrorist. This may not substantively mean that democracy is the sole indicator; it is 
convenient and likely to target the democracies since it attracts more attacks due to having 
accountable governments and open society, in which it is easier to shock the audience (Goodwin, 
2006). For example, groups like Lashkar-e Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM), both of 
which are Islamic fundamentalists and carry out deadly terrorist attacks on a democracy (i.e. India), 
are internationally designated. India institutionalizes its identity as a democracy leading the combat 
against terrorism in third world (Romaniuk, 2010), sharing similar norms that U.S. symbolizes 
globally. Therefore, designation of such groups who target a democracy, confirms my hypothesis. 
Indeed, empirically, the number of designated groups that target democracies is higher than those 
target non-democracies (See table 1 & chart 1).  
Results also signal to other implications for social construction of terrorism designation. 
The concept of legitimacy itself is not a sufficient explanation for terrorism designation. Previous 
research argued for example, that when groups are relatively weak and not representative, they are 
more likely to be designated as terrorists. According to my findings, this might not be the case. 
Empirically, three examples contradict the previous notion. Hamas, a designated non-state actor, 
has won a decisive victory in elections and has the majority of seats in the Palestinian Parliament. 
Hezbollah, which is also designated, similarly holds seats in Lebanese parliament and deploys 
large-scale military campaign internationally. Considering the U.S. commitment to Israel, even 
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though such unchallenged commitment might be rationally flawed in terms of foreign policy 
(Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006), asks whether a social construction in which subject positioning of 
us versus them takes place in domestic processes where national interests are constructed. ISIL, a 
designated non-state actor, which calls itself the Islamic State, holds territory in both Iraq and 
Syria, maintains complex military operations, collect taxes, have command and control 
infrastructure. Its relative strength is not weak, it enjoys a formidable degree of popular support 
compared to a central government with a damaged legitimacy, yet it is, incontestably, a designated 
non-state actor. Even though these groups may seem like a state as they adopt quasi-governmental 
functions (such as delivering public goods, taxing, etc.) and are not weak but have strength relative 
to their target states, they are designated as terrorist organizations. The concept of legitimacy, 
therefore, is useful yet not sufficient to explain why some groups will belong to the category of 
others many years to come. 
Future Research 
 In light of my constructivist framework and empirical analysis of terrorism designation, 
future search has many ways to go in explaining terrorism as a social problem and its manifestation 
in terrorism designation lists. To begin with, future analyses should include a distinction of 
whether the non-state actors operate domestically or transnationally. This has not been undertaken 
in this work, yet it can provide a more nuanced understanding of the construction of terrorism 
designation. Next, theoretically, one can safely reckon that the construction of terrorism 
designation is need of acknowledging the power of state. This impression need not specify 
precisely which state institutions and agencies are aboard in national interest construction but as 
Weldes (1993) points out “it is perhaps safe to say that the national interest is produced primarily, 
although not exclusively, by foreign policy decision-makers”. In my analysis, the State Department 
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safely fulfilled this position. Departing from previous literature (Chou, 2015), my approach invites 
the reexamination of the concept of interest, state autonomy and bringing the state back in 
(Skocpol, Evans, & Rueschemeyer, 1999).xix Indeed, writing on agenda setting, Kingdon (1994) 
underlines:  
“The state is more than the creature of the interest group structure or a reflection of class 
interests. People in government are not blank slates, but instead have their own interests 
and adopt their own goals and strategies. One need not reify the state to see that people in 
government are at least somewhat autonomous” (Kingdon, 1994, p.220).  
He argues that both state autonomy and the state as a reflection of society can be reflected in cases 
of agenda setting. Thus, he cautions:  
“The trick for scholars is not to opt for one or the other picture, it seems to me, but to 
specify the conditions under which and the ways in which policymaking works from the 
top down or from the bottom up.” (Kingdon, 1994, p.220).  
Contrary to Chou (2015), my theoretical engagement in social construction of terrorism 
hints that the making of terrorism designation indicates the former.xx The process of national 
interest construction and the international character of FTOs, of which public has low 
informational expertise, bring the leeway, autonomy and exercise of power for collective interests 
into the picture and warrant an examination of concept of interests.  
“The state is not only affected by society but also affects it” (March & Olsen, 1983). 
Therefore, the social construction of terrorism does not end in the subjective reality that society 
creates. Terrorism designation by the state partakes in this construction; designation by the U.S. 
State Department places it in a contextual social reality, a Western one indeed that is both objective 
and subjective for the audiences. 
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A note on methods also demands attention for future research. Gary King says, “The most 
common and scientifically productive method of building on existing research is to replicate an 
existing finding-to follow the precise path taken by a previous researcher, and then improve on the 
data or methodology in one way or another.” (as cited in Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). The 
Non-State Actor dataset, for example, renders this task challenging. The foreign names of non-
state actors make it quite hard to merge datasets from different data sources. In order to extend the 
availability of replication in this research area, a proper language standardization is needed. In fact, 
changing names of the groups, which in terrorism research is almost most likely, could hurt a 
prospective replication of data. That way, it is probable that different scholars will offer unique 
cases each time that cannot be confirmed by others. A snippet of example: Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa is 
a Non-State Actor in the dataset operates in Nigeria. In fact, the official name of Boko Haram, the 
terrorist group based in Nigeria, is ‘Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'Awati Wal-Jihad’ which is 
different from Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa, which is an Islamic organization operating in the United 
Kingdom. Although such problems are inherent in an age of world wide web of communication 
and international terrorism of an increasingly globalized character, the dataset needs improving. 
With this thesis, I also took on this task and learned a researcher’s long and hard way to conduct 
an empirical analysis. Replicating data, following all previous research require a relentless 
attention. In many cases, it is not an easy task yet rewarding. 
Finally, new venues of research can expand the framework of this thesis. Particularly, the 
framework and models employed here can be utilized also in analyses of delisting non-state actors 
from terrorism designation.xxi Specifically, in an ongoing research, I analyze a contemporary 
example of two regional parties and their delisting process. The formerly listed terrorist 
organizations Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) have 
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been removed from the list in late 2014. These two leading Iraqi Kurdish parties were classified 
as Tier III terrorist organizations, which “qualify as terrorist organizations based on their activities 
alone without undergoing a formal designation process” (Department of Homeland Security, 
2015). My theory of designation is applicable to this case especially considering how the Kurdish 
government in the north has come to challenge the designation from both legitimacy and interest 
perspectives as I have maintained in this thesis. Not only have these groups not presented a threat 
to U.S. interests (on the contrary, served them);xxii they also built a legitimate quasi-democratic 
government responsible for northern federal region of Iraq. Thus, my approach to construction of 
terrorism designation can be a good fit for analysis in this case. 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
This thesis sought to continue the scientific work on the study of terrorism research and on 
the new empirical turn in terrorism designation analyses while realizing the rather torpid position 
constructionist school of thought holds both within the Public Policy and International Relations 
scholarships. It has explored that there is rather a limited application of concept of legitimacy and 
a vague application of social construction framework in previous research. The concept of interest, 
emerging out of state, plays a role in the construction of terrorism designation. Therefore, the roles 
of legitimacy and interest should not be treated as opposition but as capturing two ends of a 
continuum of terrorism designation. The State Department’s designation of groups as others or 
deviants, is socially constructed based on the concepts of both legitimacy and interest.  
The patterns of this designation, as examined in this thesis, display the posture of U.S. 
foreign policy. Groups that target U.S. nationals, groups that target democracies and groups whose 
organizational marker is Islamic fundamentalism are prone to be put in the categories of 
illegitimacy and threat to U.S. national interests. In this posture, designation reifies the identity of 
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us (U.S.), who oppose terrorism and terrorists while positioning the designated others as 
opprobrious them (Pillar, 2003).  
Finally, the designation of terrorism is a symbolic instrument that keeps counterterrorism 
an issue of high saliency for audiences in both domestic and international settings, and thus, 
facilitate an interactive process where we learn who terrorists, the others or the deviants, are. State 
is at the center of this process and its designation partakes in the construction of terrorism. To the 


















Chapter 7: Tables and Graphs 
Table 1: 
US Foreign Terror List Non-democracies Democracies Total 
No Designation 390 133 523 
Designated 27 28 55 
Total 417 161 578 
 
* Number of designated NSAs in Democracies vs non-Democracies. 
Chart 1: 
 
* Number of designated Non State Actors (NSA) in Democracies vs non-Democracies vs All 










* Most designated groups are in Middle East and North Africa. 
Graph 2: 
 






* The likelihood of designation is significant for Islamic groups, yet as the count of attacks on US. 
Nationals gets higher, then the Islamic ideology is not the substantive indicator of designation.  
Graph 4: 
 
* When groups target U.S. nationals, the likelihood of designation is significantly and 
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v See a discussion on mala prohibita, mala in se, jus in bello and jus ad bellum in Martin, G. 
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vi Spector and Kitsuse define social problems as “the activities of individuals or groups making 
assertions of grievances and claims with respect to some putative conditions” (1977, p.75). 
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ix I thank Nazli Avdan for highlighting this point. 
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xiii See Weldes (1996) for a detailed account of how national interests are constructed.  
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